MERIT, RESPONSIBILITY, AND THUCYDIDES

SINCE other readers of Mr. Creed's recent interesting article[1] may find themselves in a similar puzzlement to my own over certain statements there made, I offer this reply in the hope of providing elucidation. It is clear that someone named Adkins has perpetrated something heinous; but that 'someone' manifestly holds views which differ in a number of important respects from my own. The most convenient method of demonstrating this fact would be to juxtapose passages of Creed with passages of my *Merit and Responsibility*;[2] but since space does not permit the juxtaposition of whole passages, I confine myself in the first part of this article to juxtaposing the references. In the second part I shall defend my own views where necessary. I shall offer my own interpretations of some passages discussed by Creed in a subsequent article.

Creed writes (219), quoting Lloyd-Jones (*Justice of Zeus*, 15) in agreement, that 'we cannot . . . infer . . . that co-operative values are unimportant in the aristocratic scheme of things . . .'. I am apparently deemed to deny this; but see *MR* 46. If there is any disagreement, it extends solely to the *relative importance* of the competitive and co-operative excellences; I shall return to this subject below.

Again, Creed writes (215) that σωφροσύνη cannot always be regarded as 'co-operative', and that in other contexts the dominant notion is one of 'prudence' or 'good sense' directed to the pursuit of one's own interest. In *MR* (245 f.) I make the same point at considerable length, and emphasize that the use of *sophron* throughout its range reflects one general world-view. (By 'one general world-view' I mean precisely that the quieter virtues are valued because, and in so far as, it is prudent to do so: a point to which I shall return.)

Creed further maintains (215) that though justice is pre-eminently a co-operative virtue it may in Greek involve helping one's friends and harming one's enemies. True; and in *MR* 274 n. 6, in comment upon the suggestion of Polemarchus to which Creed refers, I discuss this situation at some length, and relate it to the general pattern of Greek values.

On p. 219, Creed discusses military valour, and says 'while the glory won by those who display this ἀρετή may make it in one sense competitive, it is in fact displayed in service to the community and is in some of its most significant manifestations supremely sacrificial'. It would be both tedious and uneconomical of space to quote in full my argument, which is fundamental to my discussion of the question from Homer onwards, that *arete* denotes those qualities of which the community believes itself to stand most in need *because of the contribution which they make to the general well-being*. 'See *MR passim*' would be an appropriate injunction to any interested reader, 31 ff., 34 ff., 46 ff., 75 ff., 195 ff., 203 ff., 207 ff., and 220 ff. being particularly relevant.[3]

Creed also (217) claims that I hold that in (e.g.) Aeschylus, Pindar, and

[1] 'Moral Values in the Age of Thucydides', *C.Q.* N.S. xxiii (1973), 213 ff., hereafter referred to as 'Creed'.

[2] *Merit and Responsibility: a study in Greek values* (hereafter referred to as *MR*) (Oxford, 1960).

[3] For funeral speeches see *MR* 171 n. 3.

Sophocles the man commended for his *aretai* is exempt from the requirement that he observe the ordinances of *dike*. Reference to *MR* 167–8, and to the argument there summed up, will demonstrate the falsity of this claim.[1]

In a footnote Creed (217 n. 4), though without observing that we are in at least partial agreement, writes, 'It is no doubt true that a motive for the avoidance of injustice was often the fear of divine retribution, but to infer from this that it was the only reason why justice was valued begs the question. Rather an appreciation of the value of justice might lead to the view that the gods reward it.' Our disagreement here evidently resides in the second half of the quotation, concerning which several points can be made. Certainly some Greeks at least, on the contrary, value justice because and only because (or if and only if) the gods reward it: Hesiod, *Works* 270 ff.:[2]

> Now may neither I nor my son be *dikaios* any more among men; for it is a bad thing, *kakon*, to be just if the unjust man is to come off better.

Not the fifth century, of course; but the Erinyes surely speak for many early fifth-century Greeks (to put it no more strongly) when they say (*Eum.* 517 ff.):

> There is a place for *to deinon*: it should remain enthroned as a watcher over the mind. It is profitable[3] to *sophronein* with groaning. Who that, in the 'light' of his heart, trembles at nothing, would continue to reverence *dike* in like manner [as in the past]?

The Erinyes evidently believe that men have in the past behaved justly out of fear, and that removal of the fear will remove reverence for justice. Nor has the situation changed at the end of the play: at 932 ff. they are to punish just as surely, and nothing indicates that the relation of divine punishment (or fear of it) to the choiceworthiness of justice has in any way changed.

These examples are clear and explicit. What evidence can be produced on the other side? 'An appreciation of the value of justice' is of course ambiguous: value for whom and in what sense? If the phrase means that justice is valued for itself alone,[4] regardless of consequences, and that the gods are believed to reward it as a bonus, we should surely be offered some evidence to support the claim, since there is a body of evidence on the other side (and since Plato, for example, in the survey of attitudes to justice in *Republic* 1 and 2, nowhere mentions any such thing).[5] If on the other hand 'value' means 'social value', certainly quite early writers appreciate this. Solon (fr. 4 Bergk, see *MR* 75[6]) lists the ills of the city, and says that his heart bids him tell the Athenians:

> that *dusnomia* brings very many woes, *kaka*, upon the city, whereas *eunomia* makes everything orderly and as it should be, and often fetters the unjust.

[1] For Pindar see p. 165 and note b; and for a fuller discussion see now my *Moral Values and Political Behaviour in Ancient Greece* (Chatto and Windus, 1972), 75–98 (hereafter referred to as *MV*).

[2] And cf. *Odyssey* 5. 7 ff.

[3] ξυμφέρει.

[4] In the fourth century, one might cite Theodectes frag. 8 (Nauck/Snell); but the sentiment is rare even at this much later date, when the nature of piety has been debated by philosophers (as in Plato, *Euthyphro*, esp. 14 e 6 f.).

[5] The *dikaiosune* demonstrated by Plato to be an *arete* in the *Republic* is of course 'valued for itself alone' in the sense that it is *per se* a 'good thing' for its possessor and benefits him (see *MR* 284 ff.). It is not suggested that it would be worth pursuing if it were not good *for its possessor*; the *dikaiosune* concerned is a very curious quality; and to prove even so much is evidently a novelty, and requires many pages of elaborate argument.

[6] And at greater length *MV* 48 f.

Here undoubtedly Solon realises the value of *eunomia*[1] from the point of view of the city as a whole; and the observation is not unique. Simonides (fr. 5 Bergk, see *MR* 165 f., 355 ff.) speaks of the man who is not *kakos* nor utterly *apalamnos*, and 'knows city-benefiting justice'.

However, we should not attempt to evaluate these lines—or any lines—without considering their role in the contexts in which they occur. Immediately before the lines I have quoted Solon writes (4. 27 ff.):

> Thus a public *kakon* (disaster) comes to the *oikos* of each individual, and the courtyard gates are no longer able to keep it out: it jumps over the high hedge and finds every man, even if he flees to the deepest recesses of his chamber.

'Injustice is not only bad for the city but bad for you personally: avoid it.' Now my contention in *MR* is that in early Greece the individual is willing to pursue justice in so far as it is clear to him that *for whatever reason* to be just is more advantageous *for him personally* than to be unjust; and Solon here seems to be in agreement with me, and to be attempting to persuade his readers (who presumably do not share his insight) that lack of *eunomia* in the city affects each individual. In these circumstances the individual, if persuaded, should accord a higher value to *eunomia*; and he naturally does not wish to suffer from injustice himself. *MR* 61: 'To say that [the quieter values] are less valued is to say that an observer, in considering his fellows in Homeric society, more readily sees the need for their *arete* than for their moderation, *saophrosune*: it is not to say that, if he is himself wronged, he does not resent it and set a high value on the quieter values in others.' The early Greek valued *dikaiosune*—his own, or other people's—in so far as it was evidently in his own interest. Creed, if I understand him, believes that he set a high *spiritual* value on justice; and for this I can see no evidence at all.

Simonides' 'city-benefiting justice' occurs in a context in which Creed and I are certainly in disagreement. Simonides writes:

> It is hard for a man to become truly *agathos*, four-square in hands and feet and mind, wrought blameless

and, either immediately afterwards or later in the poem:[2]

> That man who is not *kakos* nor utterly *apalamnos*, at all events if he knows city-benefiting justice, is a healthy man. I will not find fault with him; for the race of the foolish is limitless.

Here it is evident that being a 'healthy' man is to be ranked somewhat lower than being an *agathos*, somewhat higher than being a *kakos*; that 'knowing city-benefiting justice' will not in itself render a man *agathos*; and that—note 'at all events'—one could be 'not *kakos*' *without* 'knowing city-benefiting justice'. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that *agathos* and *kakos* are being applied without reference to justice,[3] and that merely possessing justice is

[1] One should not assume the identity of *eunomia* with justice (see *MV* 46 ff., 56, 84 f.). It is, however, 'co-operative' in implications.

[2] Depending upon the reconstruction of the *disiecta membra* found in Plato's *Protagoras*. I discuss the poem, *MR* 165, 196, 355 ff.

[3] 'Blameless' need have no reference to co-operative excellences. See *MR* 81 (11).

regarded as being less praiseworthy than being *agathos*. And Simonides goes further:

> Nor does the maxim of Pittacus seem to me to be well said, though it was uttered by a wise man. He said that it is hard to be *esthlos*. Only a god could have this privilege. For a man it is impossible not to be *kakos* if irresistible disaster overtakes him. For when he *eu prattei* every man is *agathos*; but *kakos* if he *kakōs prattei* in some respect.

Now the logic of the passage forbids us to take *eu prattein* and *kakōs prattein* as 'behaves well' and 'behaves badly', and *kakos* as 'morally bad' in the sense of 'unjust'. It is not true that it is impossible not to behave unjustly when overtaken by disaster; and to say 'for when he behaves well every man is morally good, morally bad if he behaves badly' is a tautology, and the connecting 'for' becomes inexplicable, since, rendered thus, this sentence is not an explanation of the preceding sentence. (Nor can we interpret *agathos* and *kakos* in 'success'-terms, *eu* and *kakōs prattein* in ethical terms; for then being *kakos* is attributed to a disaster in one sentence, to bad behaviour in the next, and the connecting 'for' again becomes inexplicable.) The only solution which preserves logic and plausibility[1] is to suppose that *agathos*, *kakos*, *eu prattein*, and *kakōs prattein* are all being used to commend success and to decry failure, without reference to the justice or injustice of the persons concerned; and we have already observed that in this poem the possession of justice is inadequate to render one *agathos*.

This is a carefully reasoned poem, and it is reasonable to suppose that Simonides is using with care the words I have discussed, since they constitute the subject-matter of the poem. It is true that the poem may have been written in the late sixth century rather than the fifth; but, as I understand him, Creed denies that such values as the logic of this poem seems to demand ever existed at all. (Furthermore, if anything is innovatory in this poem it is surely Simonides' definition of the 'healthy' man, to judge both from the form of the sentence in which the term is introduced and the fact that the usage does not occur anywhere else: in his use of *agathos*, *kakos*, *eu* and *kakōs prattein* he is merely acknowledging a usage which can readily be exemplified in earlier—and later—literature.)

My contention is that it is held to be more important to be *agathos* than to be *dikaios*, precisely because the members of the community in general believe that they are in greater need of the *arete* than of the *dikaiosune* of their fellow members. (To say this is not to say that their belief is correct, nor that each member of the community has arrived at it by a process of thought: habitual deference, the process of growing up in a society in which such values are already current, will serve to maintain the belief and the values long after they have ceased to be appropriate. This too is argued in *MR.*[2]) Accordingly, a *dikaios* who is not *agathos* may find difficulty in obtaining justice when faced with an *agathos* who has behaved unjustly, as we may observe in Sophocles' *Ajax* (especially 1120 ff.), where Teucer has great difficulties when faced with Menelaus and the other *agathoi*. I have discussed this passage elsewhere, and refer my readers to that discussion.[3]

[1] Since to interpret *agathos* and *kakos* 'co-operatively', *eu prattein* and *kakōs prattein* in success-terms, produces a sense which must appear implausible to us, and would have appeared even more implausible to the Greeks of this period, who regarded *hubris* as a likely outcome of good fortune.

[2] e.g. 75 f., 238 f., 259.

[3] *MV* 65 ff.

Menelaus exemplifies an attitude which is at least as old as Homer. Even so much self-esteem as Teucer displays appears to be new; and I have argued elsewhere[1] that even in the democratic courts of Athens, for readily comprehensible reasons which I have there set out, the possession of *arete* was more important than being merely *dikaios*.

One more example.[2] In Herodotus 3. 82. 3 we find:

> In an oligarchy, when many people are practising *arete* in politics, powerful private hatreds are wont to arise; for inasmuch as each wishes to be leader and have his views prevail, they come to have powerful hatreds for each other, as a result of which civil strife develops, and as a result of civil strife, bloodshed, and as a result of bloodshed, the rule of one man.

This is presented as the likely consequence of practising *arete* in politics. Such an *arete* evidently sets competition against all comers in the interests of personal success above mere just co-operation for the general good.

Let me now turn to some more specific points made by Creed. On several occasions partial quotation or inadequate reference to context gives Creed's readers a misleading account of my argument.

Creed, p. 223: 'The only "quiet" use of these terms which Adkins discusses is the passage from the Corinthian speech at Athens discussed above (1. 37. 5, see above, p. 221, and *MR* 178–9), and even here he does little more than assert its 'startling' character, and note the evident implication that *arete* can at least involve justice.'

Creed is inadvertently misrepresenting me by partial quotation. The discussion of this passage begins 'In Thucydides, this use of *agathos may progress even further* . . .'. 'May progress even further' is intended to contrast the quoted paragraph with the previous paragraph, in which I discuss an example from Herodotus in which *agathos* commends self-control in the individual. In the Thucydidean passage *agathos* commends self-control in inter-state relations: a further step, and in my opinion a startling one, for I can find no evidence that such an evaluation was adopted earlier (but I shall discuss this below). Again, Creed quotes with approval (224 n. 2) de Ste Croix's view[3] that 'Thucydides . . . in practice drew a fundamental distinction . . . between . . . the relations of *individuals inside the State* . . . and . . . the relations *between States*'; but surely anyone who holds this general view of Thucydides might be expected to find 1. 37. 5 at least mildly surprising.

Again, Creed, p. 229 n. 3: 'Adkins's own somewhat ambiguous attitude over values at this period is well illustrated by his remark (*MR* 183): "The new usage (sc. of αἰσχρόν to describe an unjust action) is sufficiently understood without explanation [*sic*, but see the quotation below], but only a minor assault might be needed to overset it."'

On this occasion, quotation will be the most economical mode of exposition (183):

> To be able to use such a phrase as *hamartia aischra*, in a situation where a success has been gained, indicates a firmly rooted change in values. That is to say, it indicates that there has been a change in linguistic habits in at

[1] *MR* 201 ff., *MV* 119 ff.

[2] Discussed *MR* 192 (15), *MV* 70. I refer my readers to the examples and argument of *MV* chapter 4 as a whole for further material.

[3] *The Origins of the Peloponnesian War*, 16.

least a section of society: it does not indicate that all have adopted the change, nor that those who have adopted it have fully worked out its implications, nor yet that they would abide by their new usage under conditions of stress. The new usage is sufficiently rooted to be understood without explanation, but only a minor assault might be needed to overset it.

Leaving aside for the moment the question of the novelty of the values, I suggest that the possession of values and evaluations which are enunciated in peaceful moments, but are not adhered to in times of stress, is a widespread phenomenon in all societies at all times. It is not a universal phenomenon, and Creed may not have observed it; but many of my readers will have done so, and Socrates and Plato had, as may be seen from the *Crito* where, after Crito's vigorous speech which claims that Socrates is falling short of the requirements of *arete*,[1] Socrates asks him (46 c) whether their previous agreement that one should pay attention to some opinions, not to others, with regard to values was a good one; or was it a good one before it was necessary for Socrates to die, but is now evidently mere childish nonsense? This is precisely the situation, and Socrates is urging Crito not to abandon these 'new values' in a crisis: the ambiguity resides not in my attitude, but in the situation itself.

Here another observation of Creed's is relevant (227):

> Discussing the 'immoralist' challenge of the late fifth century (*MR* 232–5), however, Adkins maintains that the immoralist theses coincided with the 'traditional' uses of ἀρετή and ἀγαθός. 'Any Greek of this period', he writes (*MR* 233–4), 'was bound to find it very difficult to confute the immoralists. Exhortation was useless; for the "immoralists" and the power-politicians had plausibly pre-empted the most valued terms; and . . . ordinary man and immoralist would often agree on the exact interpretation of these terms, not merely on their general flavour.' In so far as this is not just a restatement of the by now familiar Adkins position, it fails to take account of the fact that there must at the very least have been an intermediate stage at which the 'quiet' virtues were valued, if the immoralist theses were to create the subversive impact that they did.

The quotation from *MR* 183 indicates that I do hold that there was such an intermediate stage: I am there describing it; and throughout my contention is not that 'quiet' virtues were not valued at all, at least by the majority of 'ordinary Greeks': my contention is that they were for the most part *less* valued. The lower valuation appears in a crisis, where there is a choice between courses of action, as when Socrates is in prison; and if we restore the words to the quotation from *MR* 233–4 which Creed has omitted, 'as the views of Crito and Callicles have shown', it becomes apparent that here too I am talking of crisis-situations. The words which I have restored to the quotation refer the reader to my discussion of Crito and Callicles in which I make it clear, p. 230, that 'there can be few if any more convincing portraits of the ordinary decent Athenian than Plato's portrait of Crito. No man could be further removed from being a sophist, much less an immoralist sophist.' In quiet converse with Socrates in the gymnasia of Athens, Crito was doubtless wont to accept that the 'quiet' excellences are *aretai*, and so to use *arete* in his

[1] Which I discuss, *MR* 230 ff.

ordinary conversation. Furthermore, no 'ordinary decent' member of any settled society could set *no* value on the 'quiet' excellences, whether he termed them *aretai* or not (*MR* 61). My point is that in a crisis Crito no less than Callicles uses *agathos* and *arete* to denote and commend just those qualities which will secure the prosperity and well-being of the individual household and its *philoi*, and is prepared to recommend and engage in action in defiance of the laws to secure this end. The difference between Crito and Callicles resides in their different estimate of the point at which law-breaking and injustice begins to be of benefit to the *agathos*, his *oikos*, and his *philoi*.

I now turn to the values of Thucydides. As Creed observes (223 n. 2), I do not claim to discuss every passage in Thucydides that contains the words *agathos*, *arete*, *aischron*, or *kalon*; and I do state (as Creed also observes, p. 223) that 'Thucydides was clearly very sensitive to *all* the arguments about values current in his day, and could employ them, and the linguistic usages which accompanied them, with great dramatic and rhetorical effect'. Creed further observes accurately (223) my statement that the quiet use of *arete* 'only appears in conditions of stress' (193 n. 16, 218 n. 18), and adds: 'a fairly unhelpful criterion, since the description could apply to almost every page of the history'. I certainly might have made my meaning more explicit; but I do in the very next note (193 n. 17), in discussing *aischron* as a term of quiet morals in Thucydides. On 1. 38. 5 and 3. 58 I comment: 'In both cases the speakers have a strong interest in using the new values; and cp. 5. 111. 3, where the Athenians too have strong—though different—motives for urging the Melians to abandon the traditional use of *aischron*, and 3. 63. 3 and 67. 2 (the Theban case at Plataea).'[1]

What I am saying—and it is a fundamental theme of *MR* as a whole—is that the values found in Greece during the period covered by the study are not capricious, but closely related to the situation in which those living at any particular time found themselves.[2] During the fifth century B.C. two developments occurred which inevitably produced conditions of 'stress': the Athenians obtained a position of power in Greece which neither they, nor any other Greek city, had possessed previously in historical times; and, at all events among such Athenians as were able to influence events and take an active part in directing them, belief in the gods declined. (To say this is not, of course, to claim that *no* individual prominent Athenian believed devoutly in his gods: it is to say that Athens was more secular in spirit in the second half of the fifth century than in the first half.)[3] Now my contention is that, until Athens began to establish her dominance over the Aegean, Greek cities believed themselves able to rely on the fighting abilities of their citizens to control the competitive military aspirations of their neighbours;[4] while fear of displaying a *hubris* of which the gods might disapprove, and might punish with subsequent disaster, should restrain the victor from behaving too harshly to the vanquished, and fear that the gods might punish injustice or *hubris* committed within the city should restrain its inhabitants from committing such acts against each other.

[1] Cf. also my remarks on 'stress' at *MR* 38.

[2] The phenomenon of 'cultural time lag' is prevalent (see *MR*, e.g. 75 f., 238 f., 259); but the touchstone of these values is reference to the demands of the actual situation and the needs of the community as the community understands them.

[3] On this see *MR* 164 ff., 238 f., and generally chapters vii–xi, *MV* 99 ff.

[4] Thucydides' Mytileneans agree, 3. 11. 2, even in the case of allies. I shall discuss the passage in a subsequent article.

(It should not be hastily assumed that all inhabitants were equally restrained, nor yet that *hubris* may be identified with injustice.)[1]

In the course of the fifth century both of these constraints became much less powerful; and the Melian Dialogue is, I believe, Thucydides' exploration of the effects of this upon Greek values. The Athenian position there includes the claim (5. 105) that the gods are on the side of the big battalions, so that even if there are gods they will not disapprove of what the Athenians are doing. In such a situation—which had been steadily developing for a number of decades—values are, willy-nilly, secularized: if the weaker has no expectation that the stronger will be punished by heaven for treating him unjustly, some other deterrent must be found, since the weaker needs just treatment none the less. It is, accordingly, precisely the weaker party in any transaction whom one would expect to find attempting to extend the usage of *arete* to commend just behaviour (as I say in the quoted passages from *MR*).[2] Now Creed says (224) 'Most speakers who are not Athenians and some who are show a certain sensitivity to moral issues and supposed obligations which they expect to be reflected in their hearers' and (225) 'A different attitude to inter-state morality emerges in other speeches. It emerges only in discussions of Athenian imperialism, and consists essentially in asserting the theory that it is natural for the stronger to rule the weaker, and that in all situations in which equal is not facing equal issues of justice are irrelevant; the strong will therefore pursue their own interest without concern for morality.'

If we leave on one side for a moment 'which they expect to be reflected in their hearers', Creed and I seem once again to be in broad agreement over the facts: in general, speakers in Thucydides employ value-terms as suits their own interests.[3] But who are 'the hearers'? And what relationship do Thucydides' words have to those actually uttered by Athenians, Corinthians, Spartans, Plataeans, Melians, and others? That Thucydides has *at the very least* recast their speeches into his own style is, I take it, undeniable; that he has 'translated' Ionic and Doric into Thucydidean Attic is incontrovertible. That the resulting speeches would be very difficult for the 'average Athenian'—not to mention the average Corinthian, Spartan, Plataean, or Melian—to understand if they were delivered orally in the surroundings designated in the *History* is something which I suspect I am far from alone in believing. In these circumstances, do we suppose that Thucydides is committing himself to using such words as *agathos* and *arete* when and only when (and in the manner in which) the original speaker did so? I do not myself find it possible to believe this; I do believe, on the other hand, that Thucydides in composing his 'possession for all time' had in mind as his immediate readership a small number of 'intellectual' Greeks in close touch with the intellectual developments of the day. (Creed seems to doubt this, but offers no disproof; and it seems to me that my view of Thucydides is that which most scholars have always held.) If this is the case, then the fact that his 'co-operative' uses of *agathos* and *arete* are not produced with a flourish[4] indicates merely the awareness *of that readership* of the arguments concerning value-terms that are currently taking place. In *MR* 193 n. 17 I wrote 'As he writes what is "suitable" for each speaker, i. 22, it cannot be

[1] For this see *MV* chapter 4 and index, s.v. '*Hubris*'.

[2] 193 nn. 16, 17.

[3] My contention that some values are new, some traditional, rests on different evidence, as I have shown.

[4] As is, for example, that of Euripides before a popular audience in *Elec.* 386 ff., discussed in *MR* 177, 195 ff.

supposed that he endorsed all the varied views which appear in the speeches, only that they were "in the air".' 'Writing what is suitable for each speaker' has always seemed to me to include putting that speaker's case for him as well as possible in the situation in which he finds himself, whether or no he could have expressed himself in these terms: there is then no compelling reason to suppose either that the speakers used language, including value-terms, as Thucydides does, or that a popular audience would have understood them, or been unsurprised by them, had they done so. (The foregoing paragraph gives merely an outline of my views on this subject, an adequate exposition of which requires more space than I have here. I shall return to the subject at greater length later.)

I am prevented by lack of space from discussing here those of Creed's points which relate to particular passages of Thucydides, and shall do so in a subsequent article. Since I do not deny (*MR* 183, 198 nn. 16, 17) that Thucydides' use of *agathos*, *arete*, and associated words is as wide as that of anyone at the time, my position is not affected by the conclusions of Creed's discussions. Nevertheless, many of Creed's interpretations seem to me to be far from certain, as I shall there demonstrate. Here I shall confine myself to discussing the article of MacDowell[1] cited by Creed, since Creed rests more weight upon it than it seems to me able to bear. Doubtless I ought to have discussed MacDowell's friendly and generous comments before; but my own article on '"Friendship" and "Self-sufficiency" in Homer and Aristotle'[2] (hereafter referred to as 'Friendship') appeared at almost the same time as MacDowell's article, and it seemed to me that MacDowell's comments did not in fact affect my position as stated in that article and in *MR*. I will now explain why.

MacDowell himself points out (131) that Andocides (1. 109) argues that generosity to political enemies is *arete* because it is conducive to the success of the city; I maintain in *MR* that *arete* at any time commends those qualities which are generally held to conduce importantly to the well-being of the community, and note occasions in Lysias (*MR* 211 f.) where he is offering arguments which, without querying the criteria of *arete*, attempt to extend its range of usage by pointing out other kinds of behaviour which satisfy those criteria. A supporting argument seems to be needed, as MacDowell notes (131), to demonstrate that the behaviour desiderated by Andocides will be a manifestation of *arete*; and Andocides' method of marshalling that argument seems to me to indicate that his audience would not have conceded otherwise that such behaviour was a manifestation of *arete*. In other words, it was not yet part of normal unquestioned usage.[3] But that a quality which is realized to be *importantly* conducive to the well-being of society can be enrolled as an *arete*—and in the more secular later fifth century needs to be so enrolled—is not a point of disagreement between us.[4]

In the case of Andocides 1. 118–19 (MacDowell 132) I should be inclined to suppose that such behaviour would be required by *arete* already in Homer, provided that the girls were acknowledged to be part of the group for which

[1] D. M. MacDowell, 'Ἀρετή and Generosity', *Mnem.* 4th ser. xvi (1963), 127 ff.

[2] *C.Q.* N.S. xiii (1963), 30–45.

[3] Though he may have 'no literary or intellectual axe to grind' (MacDowell 130), in the situation in which he finds himself, Andocides has a vested interest in the acceptance of this usage: another reason for suspecting a 'persuasive definition'.

[4] See *MR* 70, 78 (on Theognis 147 f.), 195, etc.

the *agathos* had any responsibility, his *philoi* (which includes relatives). 'Friendship', p. 35: 'But ἀρετή, the quality of the ἀγαθός, is also shown in protecting one's dependants, whether permanent residents or transients; and φιλεῖν, which, as we can see from the examples quoted above, includes giving food, lodging, and protection to transients, characterizes this activity, at all events in its less violent manifestations.'

Now why is Andocides prepared to take one of the girls? He *says* that it is *dikaion* to do so, as though only the claims of justice induced him, and self-interest pointed in the opposite direction. But he was willing to incur the bitter enmity of Callias to obtain possession of the other daughter when the first died. I quote MacDowell's own note:[1] 'What was virtuous about the action of Andocides and Leagros? That they exercised their right to claim the heiresses instead of leaving the responsibility for them to somebody else? Hardly, if I am right in thinking that the heiresses belonged to the lowest property-class; for in that case Andocides and Leagros, being the nearest relatives, could have been compelled to marry them or to provide dowries for them if no other claimant had come forward. . . . That they were willing to marry the girls instead of merely providing dowries? But marrying them was, presumably, the cheaper of these two alternatives; and besides it cannot really have been a very unattractive proposition if Kallias, to secure one of the girls for his son, was willing to go to the lengths described by Andocides in 120–3. I suspect that the virtuousness of Andocides' conduct was less great than he would have us believe.'

Any novelty in the evaluation must arise from being willing to assist, as an exercise of *arete*, someone not within the group of *philoi* already. But it seems that the girls already legally belong to the group, so that the generosity—in so far as it is generosity—is that already required from the *agathos* in Homer. Such *philein*[2] is not altruism; and I agree with MacDowell in suspecting that Andocides' motives here may be in fact *more* self-interested than were traditionally those of the average *agathos* in such a situation. I conclude that this is neither a new usage of *arete* nor a particularly shining example of traditional *arete*.

(Some degree of apparent disagreement between MacDowell and myself may arise from his use of 'generous', a term which in English frequently denotes not merely generous *actions*, i.e. the conferring of benefits upon others, but such actions performed from generous motives. I should myself be inclined to term Andocides 1. 109 enlightened self-interest rather than simple generosity; and I should apply the term to the traditional view of the relationship between *arete* and *philia* in general. Aristotle in his discussion of *philia kat' areten* lays emphasis on the benefits conferred by the *agathos*; but I have shown elsewhere[3] that self-interest is present, and that even where the emphasis on conferring benefits is at its strongest, in the discussion of the *megalopsychos*, the *motives* are far from generous, *E.N.* 1124^{b}9: 'And he is the sort of man to confer benefits, but he is ashamed when he is benefited; for the one is the mark of a superior, the other of an inferior.')

The most evident discrepancy between MacDowell's views and mine concerns Thucydides 4. 19. 2–3. MacDowell speculates (130) about the possibility of a 'persuasive definition':[4] 'But, it may be objected, the passage is put into the

[1] D. M. MacDowell, *Andocides on the Mysteries* (Oxford, 1962), ad loc.

[2] See 'Friendship' 36.

[3] 'Friendship' 39 ff.

[4] See C. L. Stevenson in *Mind*, 1938, 331 ff., where the usage of this phrase is explained at length.

mouths of Spartans, who have special reasons for wanting the Athenians to behave unselfishly; have they perhaps distorted the normal use of *ἀρετή*? And Thucydides can hardly be regarded as a typical Athenian democrat; has he perhaps given the word a sense which it did not bear in ordinary usage?' To this question MacDowell gives a cautious negative reply, based on the two passages of Andocides discussed above, which he regards (131) as 'bridges' to the usage of Thucydides 4. 19, whose novelty consists in the fact that *arete* there commends generosity to one's enemies in war. Now I see nothing novel in Andocides 1. 118–19; and 1. 109 seems to me to be an—argued—extension of the range of *arete*, based on traditional criteria. I had myself always supposed Thucydides 4. 19. 2–3 to embody a 'persuasive definition': Thucydides makes here a carefully prepared-for but in the last resort *unargued* attempt to change the mode of usage of a value-term. MacDowell's arguments, though elegant and ingenious, do not persuade me otherwise. Let me now offer an argument in favour of my own view.

A prevalent usage of *arete* commends behaviour which helps one's friends and harms one's enemies; a course of action which, as we have seen, may be commended also as *dikaion*. Now a 'friend', a *philos*, is someone who is already related to one by the bonds of a co-operative relationship; but traditionally in Greece an *agathos* did not always treat harshly even those of his active enemies who fell into his hands. Placed in this position, however, the enemy did not ask for clement treatment in the light of the *arete* of his victorious foe: he supplicated him; and over the situation Zeus, god of suppliants, presided. Religious sanctions were believed to be relevant. In Thucydides suppliants still present themselves, but even if they can reach consecrated ground, under the protection of the deity of the place, their safety is very precarious.[1] The situation in Thucydides in which a supplication is made which most closely resembles the situation of the Spartans here occurs when the Plataeans, starved into submission, face the victorious Spartans and Boeotians, 3. 53 ff. There no such use of *arete* occurs, but the Plataeans do supplicate the Spartans, 3. 59. 2: *προφερόμενοι ὅρκους οὓς οἱ πατέρες ὑμῶν ὤμοσαν μὴ ἀμνημονεῖν ἱκέται γιγνόμεθα ὑμῶν τῶν πατρῴων τάφων* . . . Despite the Plataeans' past services, despite their formal supplication, the Spartans are unmoved: they are concerned solely, as they say in 3. 52. 4, and repeat in 3. 68. 1, to establish whether the Plataeans have benefited (*ἀγαθὸν εἰργασμένοι εἰσίν*) the Lacedaemonians and their allies during the course of the present war. The Boeotians utter a counter-*ἱκετεία*, 3. 59. 4; but neither is taken into account by the Lacedaemonians. In these circumstances, the time is evidently ripe for a new form of persuasion to be attempted; and, I suggest, it is attempted by the Spartans in 4. 19. 2, after working up to the usage carefully by pointing out, 4. 17, that the course they are advocating will be beneficial to the Athenians, and uttering several prudential arguments. When, 4. 19, they offer a truce, they again emphasize what *they* are contributing (*διδόντες μὲν εἰρήνην καὶ ξυμμαχίαν καὶ ἄλλην φιλίαν πολλὴν καὶ οἰκειότητα ἐς ἀλλήλους ὑπάρχειν*) to the relationship that will then exist; that they are asking merely for the Spartan prisoners from Sphacteria in return, and that an end to the hazards of war will benefit both sides. Thus far we have a balance of advantages; and the Spartans, by using a long phrase for what they are giving,

[1] For example, the suppliants at Corcyra, 3. 70; 80; 81. Traditionally, to kill a suppliant at an altar or on consecrated ground was a most heinous offence, as in Thucydides 1. 126. 10 (the conspiracy of Cylon).

a short phrase for what they are asking in return, contrive to hint that the balance will not be in their favour. They then commend generosity as a means of healing great enmities and creating friendships; and it is at this point that they introduce the word *arete* to commend such generosity; but they at once balance it with 'giving *arete* in return', emphasizing that the situation which Aristotle terms φιλία κατ' ἀρετήν (*E.N.* 1156b7 ff.), *philia* in accordance with *arete*, will then exist. So it will; but the difficult transition from bitter hostility to *philia* has to be made. Traditionally, a formal supplication (ἱκετεία) would have been appropriate:[1] the behaviour of Priam in *Iliad* 24. 477 f.; but this is evidently no longer effective. As I have already said, one characteristic of the later fifth and fourth centuries which marks them out from earlier periods is an increased secularization of society, with a replacement of supernatural sanctions by social and ethical inducements to ensure the performance of desired activities.[2] In these circumstances, the most effective means of commending a form of behaviour is to subsume it under the requirements of *arete*, as Thucydides' Spartans attempt to do here. (Contrast the religious values and sanctions of Aeschylus *Supplices* 1 and *passim*,[3] Euripides *Supplices* 10 and *passim*,[4] where it is on their status as suppliants that the speakers lay emphasis.) For these reasons I take the use of *arete* here to be an attempted extension of ethical usage by means of a 'persuasive definition'.

Since the amount of space at my disposal is limited, this must suffice as an immediate reply. I shall discuss Creed's interpretations of individual passages in more detail later.

University of Chicago A. W. H. ADKINS

[1] On the whole question of ἱκετεία see now J. P. Gould, 'Hiketeia', *J.H.S.* xciii (1973), 74 ff.

[2] See *MR* chapters viii–xvi, 'Aristotle and the best kind of tragedy', *passim*.

[3] See 26, 78 ff., 188 ff., 347, 360, etc.

[4] See 113, etc. The reluctance of Theseus, 195 ff., later overcome by Aethra, 297 ff., to acknowledge the claims of the suppliant may have contemporary relevance: ἱκετεία has less force than was once the case.